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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. L. ROMNEY, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
COVEY GARAG;
8
-a corporation, . 
Defendant and Appellant. j 
AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation, 




Brief of Appellant, Covey Garage 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, E. L. Romney, about April 30, 1938, 
on a Saturday evening left his automobile at the defend-
ant garage in Salt Lake City for storage over night. The 
automobile was delivered to the garage sometime between 
ten and eleven o'clock p. m. and plaintiff thereafter 
retired to the Newhouse Hotel, just north of the garage. 
As is customarily done, the keys were left in the auto-
moble; the attendants in charge, at plaintiff's reques~ 
filled the automobile with gasoline and parked it in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
garage in the usual . manner. Shortly thereafter, about 
eleven o'clock p. m., the three attendants, all at the front 
of the garage entrance, observed defendant's automobile 
coming out, being driven by a thief. Immediately one of 
defendant's employees of the garage got into his car, 
took after the refugees, chasing them for some twenty 
blocks, all up through the east part of town and then 
back down so mew here near the scene of the collision 
between plaintiff's automobile, then discovered to be 
driven by one Albert Freeman and his notorious com-
panion, Brady Wayne Poulson, and another car, result-
ing in the crash causing the damage to plaintiff's car 
sought to be recovered in this action. How, or by what 
means or methods Freeman and his companion succeeded 
in getting into the garage is wholly unexplained and 
nowhere appears in the evidence, and the evidence is 
undisputed that the defendant's garage was maintained 
and operated in accordance with the usual practice and 
standard of similar garages and was so operated on the 
evening of the theft, the usual number of employees 
being maintained to care for the storage. 
Plaintiff's complaint, (Ab. 2) sought to hold the 
defendant liable for negligence, alleging in addition that 
said automobile was stolen from the garage by said Al-
bert Freeman and Brady Wayne Poulson. Defendant 
demurred (Ab. 4), both generally and specially to 
said complaint, primarily upon the ground (1) That in 
alleging the theft, plaintiff explained the loss and, there· 
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:; 
fore, failed to state a cause of action, and (2) That such 
complaint was indefinite and uncertain in that it no-
where appeared how or in '"hat manner defendant 
was careless and negligent and the acts of negligence 
were not set forth so as to advise defendant of the nature 
of the negligence relied upon by plaintiff. The demurrer 
was overruled, (Ab. 3) and defendant was required to 
answer. Defendant answered (Ab. 6), admitted the bail-
ment and the theft, hut denied any negligence and fur-
ther affirmatively alleged payn1ent of the loss and 
damage to the plaintiff by the American Equitable As-
surance Company and its right of subrogation by rea-
son of such payment. An order w·as made by the court 
requiring the said American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany to appear and set forth its rights and claims, which 
order, together with a copy of defendant's answer was 
served on said American Equit.hle Assurance Company. 
(Ab. 10). It was stipulated at the trial, subject to plain-
tiff's objection of immateriality that said American Equit-
able Assurance Company paid ~fr. Romney, the plain-
tiff, the amount of his loss under the policy. (Ab. 11). 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, 
plaintiff's evidence was offered and received, (Ab. 10-33} 
at the conclusion of which defendant moved for 
a judgment of non-suit and dismissal, and said motion 
was taken under advisement on the 19th day of April, 
1939, (Tr. 18) and denied on the 15th day of June, 1939, 
(Tr. 19A). Defendant's evidence was offered and re-
ceived (Ab. 34-17): said cause was orally argued to 
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the court, which took the. same under advisement until 
November 14, 1939, when a decision was entered in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant. Thereafter, 
plaintiff made application to amend the prayer of his 
complaint to ask for the allowance of interest, which 
amendment was allowed, over defendant's objection (Ah. 
38), and on the 29th day of December, 1939, over de-
fendant's objection, plaintiff's proposed findings of fact 
(Ab. 41) and conclusions of law (Ab. 43) and judgment 
(Ab. 44) were signed by the court. 
ERRORS RELIED UPON 
The errors relied upon by appellant may be class-
ified and discussed under the following groups: 
1. Errors in overruling defendant's general and 
special demurrer and proceeding with plaintiff's evi-
dence over the objections of defendant, based on the in· 
sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint. (Assignments of 
Error 1, 2, and 4) 
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to create liability 
against the defendant. (Assignments of Error 8, 9, 10, 11, 
15. 16, 17, 18 and 19) 
3. Errors in rulings on the admissibility of evi-
dence. (Assignments of Error 3, 5, 6, and 7) 
4. Error in finding and concluding that the Ameri· 
can Equitable Assurance Company had no interest in 
the action. (Assignments of Error 13 and 14) 
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5 
5. Error in permitting plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint after trial and decision of the court. (Assignment of 
Error 12) 
1. PLEADINGS 
The law is well settled that a garage such as de-
fendant maintained in this action in the absence of 
specific agreement is not an insurer of automobiles that 
are left there for storage, and there is no liability for 
damage or loss suffered on the part of the bailor, 
unless such damage was proximately caused by some 
act of negligence attributable to the defendant. 
Homan v. Burkhart, (Cal.) 291 Pac. 624: 
"It is a well-settled principle of law in this 
state that a bailee for hire is not an insurrer. * * * 
Bailee for hire is liable only when he has been 
guilty of some negligence. He is chargeable only 
with ordinary care and diligence in safeguarding 
his bailor's property." 
The instant case was brought and tried upon the 
theory of negligence, and it is submitted that plaintiff's 
complaint was insufficient in that it alleged "careless-
ness and negligence" generally and wholly failed to 
allege any specific act or failure on the part of defend-
ant or set forth how or in what manner defendant was 
careless and negligent, and defendant's special demurrer 
based on such grounds should have been sustained . 
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· .. Un9,er our statutes, a special demurrer for uncertain-
ty performs the· function of a motion to make a pleading 
more definite and certain, and Section 104-'7 -2, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933 like that in several western code 
states provides: 
"The complaint must contain: -J: * * 
"(2) A statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action in ordinary and concise 
language." 
The purpose of this provision is that the adverse party 
may be entitled to know in what particular plaintiff 
claims the defendant is at fault and to enable him to 
properly prepare his defense. Plaintiff's allegation of 
carelessness and negligence was most certainly subject 
to plaintiff's special demurrer. 
Clearly there is much more reason for the sustain-
ing of defendant's special demurrer on the grounds of 
uncertainty in the instant case, than existed in the case 
of Pennock v. Newhouse Realty Company, (Utah) 93 Pac. 
(2d) 482, where uncertainty in plaintiff's complaint ex-
isted more as to how any acts of negligence alleged 
were the proximate cause of the accident than the failure 
to allege specific acts of. negligence. In the instant case, 
although plaintiff claims negligence, no specific act of 
negligence is alleged. Justice Pratt at page 484 of the 
Pennock case says: 
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"The defendant is entitled to know what 
plaintiff has in mind. A defense to an incident of 
carelessness of an employee may be entirely dif-
ferent from a defense to a failure to afford pro-
tection against a dangerous condition of the prem-
ises." 
And Judge Larson on page 486 states: 
"The mere characterization of an act as 
'careless' or 'negligence' is not an allegation of 
fact, but merely the pleader's characterization or 
description of an act." 
And in the instant case, plaintiff's complaint was insuf-
ficient in that it alleged no act of negligence on the part 
of defendant. 4 Bancroft Code Pleading, page 3543, Sec. 
2041: 
"It is not sufficient, at least as against a 
demurrer or motion, to allege merely in genera] 
terms that an injury was caused by the negligence 
of the defendant." 
2 Bancroft Code Pleading Practice and Remedies, Supp., 
Sec. 2041, page 961: 
"The facts must be stated directly, so that 
the defendant may understand the specific acts 
of remissness with which he is charged."" 
Pullen v. City of Butte (Mont.) 99 Pac. 290: 
"The only allegation in the complaint which 
seeks to charge the defendant city with negligence 
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-is the following:. 'That the said defendant * * * 
willfully, negligently,. carelessly, and wrongfully 
caused the public sidewalk on the west ·side of 
Idaho street, between Galena and Mercury streets, 
* -1, ~·, to be placed in, and willfully, carelessly, 
wrongfully, knowingly, and negligently permitted 
the same to remain in, an unsafe, dangerous, and 
defective condition.' At the close of plaintiff's 
case, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, specify-
ing, among other grounds, that the complaint 
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action. 
"'Our Code (1 Hill's Ann. Laws 188?) Sec. 
66, requires the complaint to contain a plain and 
concise statement of the facts constituting the 
plaintiff's cause of action; and one of the great 
objects to be attained by this enactment was to 
compel the plaintiff to place upon the record the 
specific and particular facts which he claims en-
title him to recover. The field of inquiry is thus 
narrowed, and the defendant is enabled to come 
into court advised beforehand of the particular 
facts he must come prepared to contest.' 
"In our opinion the allegation that the city 
negligently placed the sidewalk in an unsafe, 
dangerous, and defective condition and permitted 
it to remain in such condition is but the state-
ment of the bare legal conclusion of the pleader, 
and did not state facts sufficient to show neg-
ligence on the part- of the city. The judgment 
and order are reversed, and the cause is remanded 
for a new trial.'' 
Price v. Atchison Water Co., (Kan.) 50 Pac. 450: 
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"The defendant in error made its plea of 
contributory negligence in the following language: 
'Further answering, defendant alleges that, if the 
plaintiffs have suffered any damage whatever, it 
is through and by reason of their own negligence 
in the premises, and that of said Melrose H. 
Price.' The case did not progress far enough to 
require evidence under this plea. Had it done so, 
the plaintiffs would have been uninformed as to 
the facts constituting the claim of negligence upon 
the part either of themselves or of the deceased 
boy. A motion by plaintiffs in error to require 
this answer to be made more definite and cer-
tain was made and overruled. It should have 
been sustained. The rule is the same in the case 
of an answer as it is in the case of a petition 
charging negligence. As to the latter it has been 
held: 'If a petition contains but a general allega-
tion of negligence, it is subject to a motion requir-
ing it to be made more definite and certain, and 
it is error for the court to overrule a proper mo-
tion presented for that purpose.' Railway Co. v. 
O'Neill, 49 Kan. 367, 30 Pac. 470. The case is re-
versed, with instructions to sustain the motion to 
make the answer more definite and certain, and 
to award a new trial. All the justices concurring.'' 
In Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Neill, (Kan.) 30 
Pac. 470, a failure to sustain a motion to make more 
definite and certain was reversible error where neg-
ligence was alleged in general terms, and it did not ap-
pear which one, if any, of the servants of defendant was 
negligent, nor what acts or omissions constituted the 
negligenC'e complained of. The court said: 
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"It had a right to know, not only which of 
its agents was chargeable with negligence, but 
also what acts or omissions of such servant or 
servants constituted the negligence complained 
of, so that its defense could be intelligently pre-
pared, with respect thereto. * * * We think the 
petition too general, indefinite, and uncertain 
as to which of the company's agents or servants 
it imputes negligence, as to what acts or omis-
sions constitute the negligence complained of, as 
well as to what proper rules for the conduct of 
trains the company violated in connection with 
the injury. The petition was therefore subject to 
a motion to make it more definite and certain. 
The motion was made at a proper time. It clear-
ly pointed out the defects of the petition, and 
fully and definitely showed in what manner it 
should be corrected. We are of the opinion, there-
fore, that the refusal of the court to require the 
plaintiff below to correct his petition was preju-
dicial error." 
Simons v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, (Cal.) 220 
Pac. 425: 
"'It should appear in what respects the de-
fendant was negligent, and that such negligence 
had a causal connection with plaintiff's injury.'" 
In Colonial Refining Co. v. Lathrop, (Okla.) 166 Pac. 
7 47, it was held not error to refuse to instruct the jury 
on the issue of contributory negligence where defend-
ant in attempting to plead contributory negligence, 
simply alleged that "such injuries claimed to have been 
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sustained by plaintiff were caused solely and only by 
negligence, carelessness and want of care of plaintiff 
herein," the court saying: 
"Defendant should be required also to ap-
prise the plaintiff of any special or affirmative 
defense he expects to make by pleading the facts 
constituting such defense. * ~': * Contributory neg-
ligence, to be available to the defendant, must be 
specifically pleaded." 
In King v. Oregon Short-Line Ry. Co., (Idaho) 55 
Pac. 665, plaintiff's complaint alleged "that the defend-
ant, by its agents and servants, not regarding its duty 
in that respect, so carelessly and negligently ran and 
managed its locomotives and cars that the same ran 
against, upon, and over said steer." It was held that 
defendant's demurrer on the grounds of 'uncertainty 
should have been sustained, the court saying: 
"Plaintiff must show acts or omissions from 
which negligence will be inferred before he can 
recover, it certainly is no hardship on him, nor 
unreasonable, to require him to allege them. Sub-
division 2, Sec. 4168, Rev. St., provides that the 
complaint must contain 'a statement of the facts 
constituting the cause of action in ordinary and 
concise language.' * * * But our Code of Civil 
Procedure has greatly changed the common-law 
rules of pleading, and requires the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action to he set forth in ordin-
ary and concise language. And in the case at bar 
facts sufficient should have been set forth to 
inform the defendant w·hat act or omission con-
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stituted the negligence complained of. The judg-
ment of the court below is reversed, with instruc-
tions to sustain the demurrer." 
In Osborn v. Carey, (Ida.) 132 Pac. 967, a special 
demurrer to the complaint, which was based on neg-
ligent diagnosis or treatment of a patient by a doctor, 
should have been sustained when such complaint did not 
allege wherein the treatment rendered was wrong and 
there was nothing to show that the treatment rendered 
was not proper from the standpoint of the concensus 
of opinion and usual practice among physicians and sur-
geons of ordinary skill and learning in the profession 
in the locality wherein defendant practiced. 
The same rule is applied where one relies on fraud, 
the pleaders in such cases being required to state the 
facts upon which they claim the fraud to be based, 
so that the party charged may know the nature of the 
claim and be prepared to meet it. Muldoon v. Brown, 21 
Utah 121, 59 Pac. 720; JYilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah 341, 
53 Pac. 994. 
2. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Neither plaintiff's evidence, the whole evidence, 
nor the findings of the court discloses (1) any particular 
act of negligence on the part of the defendant, nor (2) any 
particular act of negligence on the part of defendant 
to which can legally be attributed the proximate cause 
of the damage to plaintiff's car. On the other hand, the 
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\11udisputed evidence produced on behalf of both parties 
is that the automobile was stolen from defendant's gar-
age, and that before the fugitives could be overtaken the 
car was destroyed. 
Plaintiffs Evidence 
In attempting to prove negligence, plaintiff called 
four witnesses, C. B. Squires, plaintiff, and two at-
tendants of the garage, Remington and Jones. 
C. B. Squires simply testified that he stored his 
automobile with the defendant garage sometime in Feb-
ruary, 1938; that the next morning ,the garage failed to 
deliver to him his car (Ab. 15); that he was told the car 
had been stolen (Ab. 17) ; that the car was afterwards 
recovered (Ah. 18). On cross examination he testified 
he had no personal knowledge as to how the automobile 
was stolen or how the thieves got into the garage or any-
thing of that nature. (Ab. 18). We will hereafter dis-
cuss why certain objections to the testimony of Squires 
should have been sustained. Suffice it to say here that 
such testimony tended to prove nothing material and 
was wholly collateral to any issue in the case. There 
was no showing of similarity between such theft and 
the one in the instant case, nothing showing whether the 
Squires car was stolen in the daytime or at night, whether 
it was stolen by an employee or a stranger, did not 
show or disclose any negligence of defendant either in 
the selection of its employees or failure to afford pro-
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tection against a dangerous condition of the premise!, 
did not show a condition which the defendant might or 
should have remedied in any way, did not indicate 
any course of conduct or a neglect to remedy any con-
dition, or any negligence of any employee which would 
have any bearing or relationship to a subsequent theft 
of an automobile. 
Plaintiff testified (Ab. 19-21) to the delivery of 
his car to the garage between ten and eleven o'clock P.M. 
and about forty-five minutes after the lights of the city 
were off and the obtaining of the usual claim check; 
that the pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk in front 
of the garage at the time was heavy; that a number 
of people were parking their cars in the garage and going 
to the dance nearby; that as usual he left his keys in the 
car and one of the attendants parked it in the garage; 
that not long after he retired to the hotel, it was reported 
his car had been stolen. On cross examination, plaintiff 
testified he knew that garages, both in and out of this 
state storing automobiles required the keys to be left 
in the car, and that he had stored his car at the defend-
ant garage in the same manner for a number of years. 
Plaintiff then called Steel Remington and Kenneth 
Jones, attendants in the employ of defendant at the 
garage the night of the theft. These witnesses testified 
to the description of the garage, the manner of opera-
tion of the garage, and what took place on that particular 
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night. It was stipulated the testimony of Kenneth Jones 
would be the same as that of Steel Remington. The 
latter testified that they did not have "the slightest idea 
how Freeman and whoever was with him got inside the 
garage that night." They had "'all been wondering and 
speculating as to how he got in," and the testimony of 
Remington showed no specific act of negligence or con-
duct on the part of defendant which it could be said 
caused plaintiff's loss. Remington testified (Ab. 22-31) 
to the fact that Kenneth Jones, Ben Baxter and he were 
all on duty the evening of the theft, and that their 
duties were receiving, parking, and delivering cars and 
servicing automobiles, including the selling of gas and 
oil, and also operating an automobile laundry, but that 
the laundry closed at six o'clock in the evening. That 
the garage itself was open day and night. That it was 
very quiet and they were not busy between 10:30 and 
11:00 that evening. That there are only two doors open-
ing from the service platform in front of the garage into 
the storage portion of the garage. That these two open-
ings appear on the right hand side, looking at the picture, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", the entrance being the opening 
next to the office and the exit appearing to be about 
one-third of the way from the left side of the picture. 
That to the left of the exit door, looking at the picture, 
is the opening to the wash rack, and the opening that 
appears on the extreme left hand side of the picture is 
just a little room that is always kept locked, and no 
one ever goes in it, and it is not used as an exit or an 
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entrance. The picture shows this door on the extreme 
left side of the picture as being open, hut it is never 
used and is kept locked all the time. That whenever 
there was anybody going in the garage, they usually 
stopped them and asked what they wanted, and that 
they usually watched for them. That they didn't recall 
anybody particularly that went in between ten and 
eleven-thirty on this particular evening. That it was not 
their practice to let people go in the garage without 
knowing where they were going unless they knew the 
person, and if they did not know them, they prevented 
them from going in. That other than the entrances that 
are shown on the picture, (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A"), 
there is a hack door on the north side of the garage 
about three-quarters of the way hack, which is locked 
and closed between ten and eleven. This door is used 
by the government to store their trucks, and one of the 
government employees has a key to the door, which he 
uses in storing the government trucks sometime between 
seven and ten p. m. That one of the employees checks 
on this door after he has stored the trucks, and that 
the key is then left on the garage cash register in the 
office. That except as to this hack door, there are no 
other entrances in the garage except an entrance be-
tween the inside of the garage and another business 
property that faces on Fifth ~outh. That this place is 
always locked up with a padlock on the inside of the 
garage, so that if anyone had a key, they could not 
come through from the Fifth South entrance. That it is 
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their practice with all cars that are parked on the lower 
floor to ask the customer to leave his keys in the car. 
That in parking cars, it is the custom for the attendants 
to drive the cars in and park them, and then when the 
customers return for their cars, to go and get them and 
bring them out. That when a car would come in, they 
would meet it under the canopy right by the office, and 
it was there that they would give the customer his claim 
r.heck and take possession of the car, and then when 
they would come back with their claim check, one of 
the attendants would go and get the car for them. 
That on dance nights it was customary for a number 
of people to use the rest room at the garage, but we 
could see where they were going, and we usually watch-
ed them to see where they went and watched them to 
see that they came back out. They observed in a gen-
eral way as permitted by the other duties they had to 
do. That when Mr. Romney's car was driven out of the 
garage, the three employees were standing over by the 
little office by the front entrance on the north side of 
the drive. That from that office, which is glass on three 
sides, they have a clear view of the entire front of the 
garage and can see any corner of the whole garage. 
That he observed Mr. Romney's car coming out almosi 
instantly and even before it got through the door. That 
he observed there were two people in the front seat. 
That he had not seen these two people or any other 
people while he was there that evening go into the garage. 
That he did not have time to do anything until they 
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got out in the service entrance platform. That he im-
mediately went to his own car and went in pursuit of the 
Romney car. That at no time within an hour prior to 
the taking of this car had he observed anybody in the 
front of the garage at all. That with respect to letting 
people in the garage, they had been instructed to find 
out where they were going and why, and in the event 
they should permit them to go in and did not know 
them, the attendant usually went with them. "I haven't 
the slightest idea how Freeman and whoever was with 
him got inside of the garage that night. We have all 
been wondering and speculating as to how he got in." 
Plaintiff's own witnesses having testified that they 
had no idea how Freeman got into the garage, and it 
nowhere appearing in the evidence how Freeman and his 
companion got into the garage, nor what act or conduct 
on the part of defendant was attributed to the cause of 
the theft, there is no negligence in this case on which 
to predict liability on the part of defendant. Plaintiff 
certainly did not show in what way this garage was 
operated in any different manner than any other garage, 
and defendant's evidence was undisputed that the garage 
was operated in a similar manner to other garages. 
Pat Rosell, called to testify for the defendant, testi-
fied that it was the practice of all garages to have the 
keys left in the car. {Ab. 34-5). 
It was stipulated that in the operation of garages 
such as the one here in question that cater particularly 
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to live storage and transient storage business, that ordin-
arily sufficient employees both day and night, are main-
tained to handle the ordinary run of business by meet-
ing the cars coming in at the front entrance, taking those 
cars back into the garage, parking them, and coming 
hack and meeting other cars that are arriving, and simi-
larly when persons come for their cars to the garage, to 
take the claim check, if it is a claim check storage and 
go and get the car and bring it to the front of the garage 
and turn it over to the customer. (Ab. 35-36). 
It was further stipulated that garage attendants 
of garages similarly situated during the times when they 
are not busy handling cars, also attend to filling up gas 
tanks, greasing cars that the customers want to have 
greased and perform those ordinary duties in such a 
garage, particularly garages that do servicing in the way 
of oiling and greasing and cleaning, and so on. 
It was stipulated that on the night that plaintiff's 
car was stolen, at the hour of 9:19 p. m., all of the lights 
in the city, including inside residence and business lights, 
as well as street lights were out for a period of approxi-
mately five minutes, and that they first went out at 
9:19 p. m., and that the car was brought to the garage 
perhaps one-half or three-fourths of an hour after the 
lights were off. 
It was further stipulated that as soon as the car 
was driven out of the garage, that one of the three em-
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ployees of the garage immediately got into his car, took 
after the Romney car and chased it for some twenty or 
so blocks all up through the east part of town and then 
back down town somewhere near where the car was 
finally apprehended, or where the collision occurred be-
tween the Romney car driven by Freeman and another 
car, resulting in the crash. 
AUTHORITIES 
All the authorities are in accord with Homan v. 
Burkhart, supra, in holding that a bailee is not liable for 
damages in the absence of negligence, and with the 
exception of two or three states, all are agreed that the 
ultimate burden of proving negligence rests upon the 
plaintiff. There has grown up in the cases, however, a 
procedural rule that if plaintiff simply alleges and proves 
the bailment and a failure to deliver on the part of the 
bailee, upon demand, a prima facie case of negligence 
has been established and the defendant then has the bur-
den of proceeding with the evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption and explain the reason for failure to deliver. 
We call attention to this rule for the purpose of point-
ing out that such presumption has no application in the 
instant case for at least three reasons, namely, (1) Plain-
tiff based his complaint on negligence; (2) The loss was 
explained both in plaintiff's complaint and in plain-
tiff's evidence by the undisputed fact that the automo-
bile was stolen from defendant's garage; and (3) Plain-
tiff proceeded at the trial, the theft being admitted, and 
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undertook to prove negligence on the part of defend-
ant. \Ve will discuss the authorities on these points. 
Allegation or Proof of Loss by Fire or Theft 
Completely Overcomes the Presumption 
jones on Evidence, Civil Cases, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, pg. 351, 
Sec. 186: 
"***Where the bailee's default is explained 
by proof that the goods have been lost, destroyed 
by fire or stolen, and the bailee is therefore un-
able to deliver them, there is no prima facie evi-
dence of his want of care; and plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing the bailee's fault in the 
premises, since the court will not assume, in the 
absence of proof, that the loss, fire or theft was 
the result of negligence." 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 
(Wash.) 208 Pac. 55: 
"We hold that the prima facie case made by 
the bailor, by showing that the bailee failed to 
return the goods, may he overcome by the bailee 
showing that the goods have been stolen, and that 
thereafter the burden of showing negligence rests 
on the bailor." 
The following cases all sustain the same rule: 
Beard v. Haskel Park Bldg. Corp., 248 Ill. App. 
467; 
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Lader v. W arsher, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 160; 
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Greenberg, 274 N. 
Y. S. 854; 
Marsh v. Penn. R. Co., (Va.) 167 S. E. 274; 
Delaware Dredging Co. v. Graham, (Pa.) 43 Fed. 
(2d) 852; 
Stone v. Case, (Okla.} 124 Pac. 960; 
Homan v. Burkhart, (Cal.) 291 Pac. 624; 
England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage, (Cal.) 271 Pac. 
532; 
Vereinigte Aluminum-Werke Aktienges-Eleschaft 
v. Atl. Tidewater Terminals, 241 N.Y. S. 597; 
Blackburn v. Norris, (Ohio) 189 N. E. 262; 
Knights v. Piella, (Mich.) 69 N. W. 92; 
Chaflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 31 Am. Rep. 467; 
Allen v. Fulton Motor Co., 128 N. Y. S. 419; 
Belt R. & Stockyard Co. v. McLain, (Ind.) 106 N. 
E. 742; 
Standard Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. of Liverpool v. 
Trader's Compress Co., (Okla.) 148 Pac. 1019; 
Bryan v. Chicago & A. R. E. Co., 169 Ill. App 181; 
Colburn v. Washington State Art Ass'n, (Wash) 
141 Pac. 1153; 
Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway Dist., (Ida.) 260 
Pac. 162; 
McKeever v. Kramer, (Mo.) 218 S. W. 403; 
Liberty Ins. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co., 46 
N.Y. S. 576; 
Scott v. Sample, (La.) 87 So. 478; 
Feld v. Slaven, 210 N.Y. S. 525; 
Ft. Smith & W. R. Co., v. Syracuse Portrait Co., 
(Okla.) 245 Pac. 600; 
Scott v. Columbia Compress Co., (Ark.) 249 S. W. 
13; 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dennis, (Mich.) 204 N. W. 
89; 
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JVilson v. Christal, 176 N. Y. S. 341; 
Galowitz v. il1agner, 203 N. Y. S. 421; 
]Junger Auto. Co. v. American Lloyds, (Tex.) 267 
s. w. 304; 
Bowles v. Payne, (Mo.) 251 S. W. 101; 
Glende v. Spraner, 198 Ill. App. 584; 
Rhodes v. TVarsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101. 
The fact of the theft in the instant case was un-
disputed; it was pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, ad-
mitted by defendant in its answer, and appeared in 
plaintiff's evidence. 
TV hen plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the 
theft was caused by the negligence of defendant, plain-
tiff must prove such negligence. 
6 Am. ] uris., p. 446, Sec. 368: 
"In Actions Based on Negligence. * * * The 
weight of modern authority supports the rule that 
the ultimate burden of proving negligence rests 
upon the bailor, and if, at the close of all the 
evidence, the jury is in doubt whether due care 
was exercised, the bailor will fail. In such cases 
the bailor has made negligence a factor in his 
case, and the rule applies that the party seeking 
recovery must prove each essential element of 
his cause of action. This rule is generally sup-
ported by those decisions where the fact is as-
sumed, conceded, or established by proof that 
the property bailed was stolen, injured or des..: 
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troyed by fire, or injured or its return prevented 
by some other cause which, in itself, warrants 
no inference of fault on the part of the bailee." 
We mention this because some courts make a dis-
tinction between (1) actions based purely on contract 
or for conversion, where no allegation of negligence is 
made in plaintiff's complaint, and (2) actions brought to 
recover for negligence. In the former the action being 
based purely on contract or for conversion, plaintiff 
may simply allege and prove the bailment, demand and 
failure to return the goods. Then the defendant must by 
way of affirmative defense allege and prove loss of the 
property without negligence on his part. In the latter 
type of case, where plaintiff alleges negligence, the bur-
den is upon plaintiff throughout to sustain his allega-
tion by proof of specific negligence. 
In Metropolitan Electric Service Co. v. Walker, 
(Okla.) 226 Pac. 1042, the court said that an instruction 
placing the burden on defendant of rebutting negligence 
"would be justified only in a case where plaintiff had 
based his petition squarely upon the bailment with no 
allegation of negligence on the part of the bailee, and 
with no evidence introduced by the bailee tending to 
explain the loss of the property." 
In Stone v. Case, (Okla.) 124 Pac. 960, where a 
piano was destroyed by fire and the plaintiff alleged 
negligence and loss by fire, the court said: 
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Lader v. W arsher, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 160; 
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Greenberg, 274 N. 
Y. S. 854; 
Marsh v. Penn. R. Co., (Va.) 167 S. E. 274; 
Delaware Dredging Co. v. Graham, {Pa.) 43 Fed. 
{2d} 852; 
Stone v. Case, (Okla.) 124 Pac. 960; 
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Allen v. Fulton Motor Co., 128 N. Y. S. 419; 
Belt R. & Stockyard Co. v. McLain, (Ind.) 106 N. 
E. 742; 
Standard Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. of Liverpool v. 
Trader's Compress Co., (Okla.) 148 Pac. 1019; 
Bryan v. Chicago & A. R. E. Co., 169 Ill. App 181; 
Colburn v. Washington State Art Ass'n, (Wash) 
141 Pac. 1153; 
Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway Dist., (Ida.) 260 
Pac. 162; 
McKeever v. Kramer, (Mo.) 218 S. W. 403; 
Liberty Ins. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co., 46 
N.Y. S. 576; 
Scott v. Sample, (La.) 87 So. 478; 
Feld v. Slaven, 210 N.Y. S. 525; 
Ft. Smith & W. R. Co., v. Syracuse Portrait Co., 
(Okla.) 245 Pac. 600; 
Scott v. Columbia Compress Co., {Ark.) 249 S. W. 
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Pac. 162; 
McKeever v. Kramer, (Mo.) 218 S. W. 403; 
Liberty Ins. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co., 46 
N.Y. S. 576; 
Scott v. Sample, (La.) 87 So. 478; 
Feld v. Slaven, 210 N.Y. S. 525; 
Ft. Smith & W. R. Co., v. Syracuse Portrait Co., 
(Okla.) 245 Pac. 600; 
Scott v. Columbia Compress Co., (Ark.) 249 S. W. 
13; 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dennis, (Mich.) 204 N. W. 
89; 
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JVilson v. Christal, 1'76 N. Y. S. 341; 
Galowitz v. 1lfagner, 203 N. Y. S. 421; 
]Junger Auto. Co. v. American Lloyds, (Tex.) 267 
s. w. 304; 
Bowles v. Payne, (Mo.) 251 S. W. 101; 
Glende v. Spraner, 198 Ill. App. 584; 
Rhodes v. TVarsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101. 
The fact of the theft in the instant case was un-
disputed; it was pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, ad-
mitt~d by defendant in its answer, and appeared in 
plaintiff's evidence. 
fVhen plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the 
theft was caused by the negligence of defendant, plain-
tiff must prove such negligence. 
6 Am. juris., p. 446, Sec. 368: 
"In Actions Based on Negligence. ~<: -:~ ~<: The 
weight of modern authority supports the rule that 
the ultimate burden of proving negligence rests 
upon the bailor, and if, at the close of all the 
evidence, the jury is in doubt whether due care 
was exercised, the bailor will fail. In such cases 
the bailor has made negligence a factor in his 
case, and the rule applies that the party seeking 
recovery must prove each essential element of 
his cause of action. This rule is generally sup-
ported by those decisions where the fact is as-
sumed, conceded, or established by proof that 
the property bailed was stolen, injured or des-
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troyed by fire, or injured or its return prevented 
by some other cause which, in itself, warrants 
no inference of fault on the part of the bailee." 
We mention this because some courts make a dis-
tinction between (1) actions based purely on contract 
or for conversion, where no allegation of negligence is 
made in plaintiff's complaint, and (2) actions brought to 
recover for negligence. In the former the action being 
based purely on contract or for conversion, plaintiff 
may simply allege and prove the bailment, demand and 
failure to return the goods. Then the defendant must by 
way of affirmative defense allege and prove loss of the 
property without negligence on his part. In the latter 
type of case, where plaintiff alleges negligence, the bur-
den is upon plaintiff throughout to sustain his allega-
tion by proof of specific negligence. 
In Metropolitan Electric Service Co. v. Walker, 
(Okla.) 226 Pac. 1042, the court said that an instruction 
placing the burden on defendant of rebutting negligence 
"would be justified only in a case where plaintiff had 
based his petition squarely upon the bailment with no 
allegation of negligence on the part of the bailee, and 
with no evidence introduced by the bailee tending to 
explain the loss of the property." 
In Stone v. Case, (Okla.) 124 Pac. 960, where a 
piano was destroyed by fire and the plaintiff alleged 
negligence and loss by fire, the court said: 
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" * ~-r * It alleges that the loss was caused 
by fire, and that the fire was caused by defend-
ant's negligence. In alleging a loss by fire, the 
defendant was relieved of the presumption of 
negligence, and in alleging that the fire was caused 
by negligence, plaintiff assumed the burden of 
proving such negligence. Her right of recovery 
is based upon defendant's negligence. She must 
prove this negligence in order to fix a liability 
on him. For, under the great weight of authority, 
and under the light of reason, where the loss of 
bailor's property is occasioned by fire, robbery, 
burglary, or theft, or by any means which would 
ordinarily and reasonably seem to be unavoidable, 
the bailee is relieved of the presumption of neg-
ligence in the loss, and of the consequent burden 
of interposing an affirmative defense. * * ~'r Story, 
Bailm. Sees. 213, 278, 339, 454, and authorities, 
notes 3, 4. 'All bailees, with or without a special 
contract, are prima facie excused when they show 
loss or injury by act of God or of public enemies, 
and ordinary bailees in a variety of lesser in-
stances, such as fire, loss by mobs, or robbery.'" 
Glover v. Spraker, (Ida.) 292 Pac. 613: 
" * * ~-r The rule is settled in such case that, 
when a prima facie case is made, the burden is 
on the bailee to account for the loss of the article; 
but, when that is shown, the burden is then upon 
the bailor to establish negligence on the part of 
the bailee. Scott v. Columbia Compress Co., 157 
Ark. 521, 249 S. W. 13. It necessarily follows that, 
if the bailor himself accounts for the loss, and 
charges it to the bailee's negligence, he has lifted 
the burden from the bailee's shoulders, and, until 
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negligence is proven, the bailee need not open his 
mouth." 
Homan v. Burkhart, (Cal.) 291 Pac. 624: 
" * * * The weight of authority seems to he, 
at least in actions based on negligence, that the 
ultimate burden of proving negligence is ordin-
arily upon the bailor, where he is seeking to re-
cover for the loss of property which it is conceded, 
as it is in the instant case, or which the evidence 
tends to show, with reasonable certainty, has been 
stolen while in the possession of the bailee. * * * " 
And in the later California case of U Drive & Tour, 
Limited v. System Auto Parks, Limited, 71 Pac. (2d) 354, 
the court said: 
"'Under the rule settled in Wilson v. Crown 
Tr. Co., if plaintiff alleges a loss by fire or theft, 
and charges this was due to defendant's negli-
gence the burden is on plaintiff to prove such neg-
ligence. See, also, Wilson v. Calif. C. R. R. Co., 94 
Cal. 166, 172 (29 P. 861, 17 L. R. A. 685). So it 
seems that the answer to the question, on whom 
is the burden of proof as to defendant's negli-
gence, depends on the pleadings.'" 
In view of the fact that plaintiff based his com-
plaint on negligence and also alleged the fact of the 
theft, and. the further fact that plaintiff did not rest his 
case on such presumption, but proceeded with the trial 
on a fishing expedition and undertook to prove specific 
negligence on the part of defendant, there is no room 
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bailment and failure to deliver having been admitted 
by defendant, there would have been no occasion for 
plaintiff proceeding with further proof. In Delaware 
Dredging Company v. Graham, (E. D. Pa.} 43 Fed. (2d) 
852, it is held that where the bailor does not rest his 
case upon proof of delivery and failure to return, but 
produces evidence to show the circumstances of loss, 
his case fails unless the bailee's negligence affirmatively 
appears from such proof. Any possible theory of plain-
tiffs case based on presumption is, therefore, entirely 
tliminated from this case. 
We have heretofore reviewed the evidence in the 
Instant case. We have failed to find any case holding like 
evidence sufficient to sustain a decision in favor of 
plaintiff based on negligence. The facts in the instant 
case are less favorable to plaintiff than even those in 
the case of Swain v. Twin City Motor Company, (N. 
Car.} 178 S. E. 560, where it was held a non-suit should 
have been granted. The following portion of the opinion 
of the Swain case discloses the evidence and the hold-
mg of the court: 
"The pertinent facts disclosed by plaintiff's 
testimony are as follows: 'I traded for the car 
with Mr. DeTamble, personally, out at his home 
on Tuesday night, and he told me to bring it back 
the next day that they would wash it, grease it 
and fix it up for me. * * * I took it back Saturday 
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morning and left it at defendant's place of busi-
ness to have it washed and greased. I drove the 
car in their place of business and asked Mr. Hun-
ter, the man who checks cars in and checks them 
out, where to put it. He told me to drive it back 
inside and leave the keys in it for he had to take 
it up on the next floor to the wash-pit. I did leave 
the keys in the car. * * * About eleven o'clock on 
the Saturday that I left the car there, Mr. Hunter 
called me on the phone and said somebody had 
stolen my car. -1, * * It was about eight o'clock on 
Saturday morning that I left my car. at the Twin 
City Motor Company and they notified me it was 
stolen about eleven o'clock that morning, about 
three hours after I had left it there. * * * The 
Twin City Motor Company building has three 
floors, including the basement, and I left my car 
on the first floor, with the garage. * * * When Mr. 
Hunter called me to tell me my car had been 
stolen he said he saw a fellow standing out there 
looking at the cars, leaning up against the wall. 
* * * He said he took notice of him and then went 
on to doing something to another car, and saw him 
go out the door; that he like to hit a fellow, he 
went out the door so fast. * * * Mr. Hunter told 
me he saw a fellow with a light overcoat on. well 
dressed, leaning up against the wall, looking at 
the cars, and said when he went to turn his back 
to him and do something else, he saw him go out 
with my car.' There was further evidence that the 
· doors of the garage were open for patrons to come 
in, and that no special employees or watchmen 
were placed at the entrance. 
"Hunter, a witness for defendant, testified 
that when plaintiff left his car in the garage, 
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'we greased the car and sent it upstairs to have 
it washed. The boy washed it and brought it 
down stairs about quarter to eleven or something 
like that. I was busy around there waiting on 
people and I saw a man standing there, a little 
larger than I am, a nice looking fell ow. I told him 
I would wait on him in just a few minutes and 
went ahead doing what I was doing, and the 
next thing I knew * ~~ ~~ I heard a noise going 
out the door. I looked up and the car was going 
out as fast as it could go. ~~ * * There were five 
or six people in the depariment where Mr. Swain's 
car was stored at the time it was taken out and 
there were a number of other cars in there. The 
place was full, six or eight cars in front, and the 
man just had room to drive Mr. Swain's car 
out. Mr. Swain's car was parked about 100 feet 
from the door, about the center of the building. 
* * * There was nothing unusual about the con-
duct or appearance of the person whom I had 
seen standing in the garage and who drove Mr. 
Swain's car out. * * * He was nice looking, well 
dressed, seemed to be about twenty-eight years 
old. Strangers frequently come in the garage to 
have work done on cars. * * * I often have to 
let people wait while I wait on other customers. 
* * * There was nothing said about leaving the 
keys, but he had to leave the keys in the car 
or we couldn't move it up to the next floor to 
wash and grease it. * ~~ * The car was left with 
the keys in it. It was between ten thirty and 
eleven o'clock that the man whom I have des-
cribed, came in. * * ~·, The car was backed up 
against the wall with the side towards the doors 
of the building.' 
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"In the case at bar, there is no dispute as 
to the fact of theft. It is not controverted that 
the car was parked within the garage, one hun-
dred feet from the door, and that there were 
attendants in and about the garage at the time. 
Consequently, the only fact upon which negli-
gence could be based was the leaving of the keys 
in the car. In this connection it must be observed 
that the car could not be moved without the keys, 
and that the leaving of the keys was not only 
essential to rendering the service requested, but 
for moving the car in case of fire and other 
emergency in the garage. 
"Interpreting the evidence with that degree 
of liberality required in motions of nonsuit, no 
evidence of actionable negligence appears in the 
record, and the motion for nonsuit should have 
been granted. 
"Reversed." 
In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the fact 
'>f the theft. It is not contradicted that the car was 
~arked within the garage approximately one hundred 
feet from the door, and that there were the usual at· 
tendants in and about the garage entrance. Leaving keys 
in the car as in the Swain case is necessary to moving 
the car in case of fire and other emergency, and is thr 
custom of all garages and this practice was well known 
to plaintiff. Like in the Swain case, there was no evi· 
dence of negligence, and certainly no specific act of 
negligence to which the court could attribute the proxi-
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mate cause of the loss. The evidence is undisputed that the 
attendants observed the car coming out almost instantly, 
and even before it emerged through the entrance, and 
that all possible efforts were made to recover the auto-
mobile. 
In Perera v. Panama-Pacific International Exposi-
tion Co., (Cal.) 175 Pac. 454, it was held that before 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff can be sustained, there 
must be something in the evidence to gauge what is 
reasonable care and protection, and in that case a ver-
dict was directed for the defendant where plaintiff sued 
to recover damages for loss of jewels left in the sole 
custody of defendant as an exhibit in the exposition. 
There were detectives placed throughout the building; 
the section where the theft occurred was attended in the 
same manner as other sections; and plaintiff was cogni-
zant of the manner the jewelry was placed on exhibit. 
The jewels were stolen by prying into an exhibit case 
while one of defendant's attendants was on duty at the 
time, engaged for a moment with a customer. It fur-
ther appeared in the evidence that some nine or ten 
evenings before this theft, a case in the same exhibit was 
opened and some jewelry stolen, but there was no evi-
dence as to the circumstances under which this theft 
occurred. The court said: 
"There is nothing in the evidence reasonably 
warranting a conclusion that the representative 
of defendant in charge of this section at the time 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
of the theft was guilty of any lack of ordinary 
care, or that the defendant was negligent in not 
having more than one attendant in the section." 
And in answer to plaintiff's claim that there was not 
sufficient police protection for the exhibits in the build-
ing, the court continued: 
"We find in the evidence no sufficient gauge 
by which it may fairly he concluded that the 
police protection so furnished was not reasonably 
adequate; that is, that it was less than a reason-
able man, in view of all the circumstances, would 
deem essential to the proper protection of the var-
ious exhibits. 
"It seems to us that any conclusion of want 
of ordinary care in the matter of police protec-
tion would he one based solely on mere conjecture 
. " or surmise. 
And concerning the prior theft: 
"The prior theft is of no practical import-
ance in this connection, in view of the want of 
evidence as to the circumstances thereof. The 
burden was on plaintiff to affirmatively show 
negligence. It is true, of course, that evidence of 
facts and circumstances from which want of or-
dinary care may reasonably he inferred is suffici-
ent to support a conclusion of negligence, in which 
event the question of negligence is one for the 
jury. But the difficulty here is that the facts 
and circumstances shown by the evidence furn-
ish no sufficient basis for any such inference. 
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This being the condition of the proof, the trial 
court properly directed the jury to render a ver-
dict for the defendant." 
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pacific Trans-
fer Co., (Wash.) 208 Pac. 55, a judgment in favor of plain-
tiff was. reversed and the case remanded with directions 
to dismiss because plaintiff had failed to prove neg-
ligence. 
"All that the testimony shows in this case is 
that the bailee did not return the goods because 
they were stolen by two of its employees without 
its knowledge or connivance. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, the mere fact that the goods in stor-
age have been stolen no more shows negligence 
than the fact that in a personal injury case the 
plaintiff was injured while in the employ of the 
defendant shows negligence. The burden here was 
on the respondent to show that the theft of its 
goods was the result of some negligent act of the 
appellant. Mere proof of theft is not proof of 
negligence. 40 Cyc. 470; 27 R. C. L. 1002." 
In Marsh v. Penn R. Co., (Va.) 167 S. E. 274, failure 
to plead and prove specific negligence was fatal to 
plaintiff's case. 
It cannot be determined whether the trial court 
concluded that liability should be imposed without neg-
ligence, or that he could speculate that negligence ex-
isted in the absence of proof. Utah is definitely com-
mitted to the uniform rule that a judgment or verdict 
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cannot be based upon speculation, conjecture, or sur-
mise. There is merit in the saying that "Doors and locks 
are effective to keep out honest people only." It was 
even possible to gain entrance to the United States Mint 
in San Francisco. In this case, for the purpose of theft, 
entrance could be gained in innumberable ways, by 
hiding in the back of an automobile, slipping through 
the door while the city was in darkness, entering while 
the post office mechanic was running mail trucks in 
the back way, hiding in the garage during the day time, 
and certainly defendant could not be said to be neg-
ligent if a thief so entered, but in this case, there is 
not even proof of how entrance was gained. His method 
of entering is a matter of pure speculation or conjecture. 
The mere fact that he gained entrance is no proof of 
negligence. In order to sustain the judgment, it is neces-
sary first to speculate on the method of entering, then 
speculate as to whether the defendant was negligent in 
permitting such entrance, and then speculate as to wheth-
er the loss itself was the result of such speculated neg-
ligence. The facts in this case are not similar to those 
in cases where a garage is left unattended, or where an 
insufficient lock is on a door, or where an unenclosed 
parking lot is left unattended, as in such cases the facts 
disclose that the theft was caused from a determined 
negligence, while in this case not only is there a lack 
of evidence of any negligence, but a total failure to 
attribute the theft to any such failure. The following 
authorities, while not similar in fact, support the un-
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avoidable conclusion that this judgment was based upon 
pure speculation and conjecture. 
In Quinn v. Utah Gas and Coke Company, 42 Utah 
113, 129 Pac. 362, plaintiff was paying a bill at the 
cashier's window in defendant's place of business and an 
ink bottle having been tipped over and being undis-
covered ran onto plaintiff's clothing; there was no evi-
dence as to how the bottle was overturned. The court 
reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff and directed 
a verdict for the defendant saying: 
"In the case at bar there is not the slightest 
evidence with respect to who overturned the ink 
bottle, or how, or when it was overturned. * * * 
In view of the evidence, how could the appellant 
guard against an accident such as the overturning 
of an ink bottle or ink well in use by the defend-
ant's servants? 
"Counsel for respondent contend that neg-
ligence may be inferred in this case in view of the 
duty that the law imposes on appellant, but neg-
ligence must be deduced from facts. From what 
fact or facts, as they appear in this case, is it to 
be inferred? The doctrine is elementary that in 
cases where the maxim of res ipsa loquitur does 
not apply, negligence may not be presumed or 
inferred merely because an accident occurred. 
In this case all that is shown is that a bottle or 
well containing ink, in some way unknown, was 
overturned, and that the ink was spilled, and 
some of it dripped upon respondent's dress and 
damaged it. At most, therefore, the case falls 
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within the familiar doctrine that 'when a plain~ 
tiff produces evidence that is consistent with an 
hypothesis that the defendant is not negligent, 
and also with one that he is, his proof tends to 
show neither.' * ·k * Mere conjecture, however, 
cannot support a finding of negligence." 
In Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 8?' Utah 434, 49 Pac. 
(2d) 958, a customer was injured by coming in contact 
with a splinter of glass projecting from a show case 
in defendant's store. It was not shown how or when the 
glass was broken. In reversing the lower court and hold-
ing a non-suit should have been granted, the court said: 
"We cannot see how this case differs from 
the Quinn Case. In that case a bottle of ink had 
spilled, and plaintiff's dress was damaged by ink 
running upon it. In this case there was a cracked 
panel in the showcase and the person of plain-
tiff was injured. In neither case did any one 
know how the ink was spilled or the glass broken. 
In both cases the cause of the spilled ink or the 
broken glass may have been caused by the cus-
tomer who was damaged or by another customer, 
or may have been caused by some representative 
of the company without negligence and unnoticed 
when it was done, or, in both cases, it may have 
been caused by the negligence of the company 
through a servant. The difficulty is that it is 
in the realm of speculation.'' 
In Fritz v. Electric Light Company, 18 Utah 493, 56 
Pac. 90, an employee of defendant was electrocuted while 
at service in defendant's electric plant. It was contended 
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that defendant was negligent by reason of the clutch 
or lever having been left near a live dynamo. There 
was no evidence as to how the deceased came in contact 
with the dynamo. The court said: 
"Just how the decedent came in contact with 
with the dynamo and caused the fatal current to 
pass through him is a matter of speculation and 
conjecture. * * ,-: To entitle the plaintiffs to re-
cover it was incumbent upon them to establish 
the negligence of defendant by some evidence, 
and that such negligence was either the cause of, 
or contributed to the accident. Negligence can-
not be presumed, nor the question thereof left 
to conjecture. In the case of Sorenson v. Monasha 
Paper & Pulp Co., 56 Wis. 338, the learned court 
tersely, and, we think, correctly, stated the rule 
as follows: 
"'When liability depends upon carelessness 
or fault of a person or his agents, the right of 
recovery depends upon the same being clearly 
shown by competent evidence; and it is incum-
bent upon such a plaintiff to furnish such evi-
dence to show how and why the accident oc-
curred, some fact or facts by which it can be 
determined by the jury, and not left entirely to 
conjecture, guess or random judgment, upon mere 
supposition, without a single fact shown.'" 
In Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 
Pac. 1066, it was claimed the defendant was negligent 
in leaving a box car on a sidetrack so close to the m~in 
track that deceased riding on the side, came in contact 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
therewith and was killed. There was no positive pr 
that the cause of deceased's death was his coming in c, 
tact with the side car. In affirming a judgment of n 
suit, the court said: 
"The evidence must, however, do more tl 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability 
to the cause of the injury." 
See also Dahl v. Charles A. Krause Milling ( 
(Wis.) 289 N. W. 626. 
In the case before the court there is not one sin 
fact shown which under the evidence can he said to 
the basis of carelessness or negligence on the part 
defendant, nor is there any evidence by which it c 
possibly be determined that such fact, if its existeJ 
were supported by evidence, had even a remote conn 
tion with the real or actual cause of the theft. Appell 
is wholly uninformed, even at this late date, as to w: 
act of carelessness plaintiff claims or the trial co 
purports to have found to be the basis of liability; ~ 
under the authorities, plaintiff was entitled to he 
formed from plaintiff's complaint before it was 
quired to answer in what particular it was claimed 
defendant was negligent. If this is not a case of p 
speculation, why is it that the plaintiff did not spec 
in his complaint wherein he claimed defendant , 
negligent? And why is it that the court apparently ba 
its decision on negligence, hut failed to specify whe1 
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defendant was negligent. It cannot be determined from 
the pleadings, the evidence, nor the findings of the 
court, nor elsewhere whether negligence is claimed by 
reason of the manner of conducting defendant's busi-
ness, a dangerous condition of the premises, or an inci-
dent of carelessness on the part of some employee, and 
if the latter, what employee it is claimed was negligent, 
much less, that the evidence supports any one of such 
claims. Speculation must be resorted to, first, to deter-
mine the manner of entrance of Freeman into the gar-
age; second, whether defendant was negligent in per-
mitting such entrance and in what particular; and, third, 
whether the loss was a proximate result of such specu-
lated negligence. The evidence in this case is undisputed 
that garages similarly situated are all maintained and 
operated in a manner like the defendant's garage, and 
that keys are always left in the car, and this method 
of operation was fully known to plaintiff. It was undis-
puted that defendant had the usual number of attend-
ants and employees on duty at the station the night 
of the theft, and that the employees saw the car being 
driven from the garage almost instantly and even before 
it had emerged from the exit and did all in their power 
to overtake the fugitives. There is no evidence that de-
fendant failed in any particular to measure up to the 
standard of reasonable care required by law. Plaintiff 
neither pleaded nor proved any specific breach of duty, 
nor any act of carelessness proximately causing the 
loss, a most fundamental requirement in negligence cases. 
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The line must be drawn between suggestions and pos-
sible precautions not shown in the evidence to be actual-
ly connected with the loss, and evidence of actual neg-
ligence sustained by proof of actual proximate cause. 
Facts, not conclusions, must be determined. As stated 
in Quinn v. Utah Gas, supra, "when a plaintiff pro-
duces evidence that is consistent with an hypothesis 
that the defendant is not negligent, and also with one 
that he is, his proof tends to show neither." Conjecture 
cannot support a finding of negligence. 
3. ERRORS IN RULINGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE 
Assignment of Error No. III 
The plaintiff, E. L. Romney, simply testified to 
facts that were admitted in the pleadings, namely, the 
delivery of the car to the garage, and the theft, and his 
testimony in no way tended to establish liability, and 
the trial court should have sustained defendant's motion 
to strike all the testimony of that witness. 
Assignments of Error Nos. V and VII 
Plaintiff called the witness Squires, who attempted 
to testify to a previous theft from defendant's garage. 
Defendant objected to the reception of this testimony 
before the witness testified (Ab. 50-1) and also moved 
to strike such testimony afterward, (Ab. 54) on the 
grounds that such testimony was irrelevant and imma-
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terial and raised a wholly collateral issue and did not 
show or disclose any facts as to an occurrence due to any 
negligence, nor show a condition which the defendant 
might or should have remedied in any way, nor indicate 
any course of conduct, nor a neglect to remedy any 
condition or any negligence of any employee which 
would have any bearing or relationship to a subsequent 
theft of an automobile. 1 ]ones on Evidence, Civ. Cases, 
4th Ed. Sec. 163, page 2??, states the general rule as fol-
lows: 
"In actions to recover damages on account 
of injuries caused by negligence, collateral facts 
are generally held to be irrelevant to the disputed 
issues and evidence thereof is held to the inad-
missible." 
Similarly in negligence cases, it is the well-estab-
lished rule that evidence of prior accidents is inadmis-
sible for the purpose of proving actionable negligence. 
In Croddy v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (Iowa) 60 
N. W. 214, in an action brought to recover for the kill-
ing of a colt at a railroad crossing, plaintiff was not 
permitted to show that stock had previously been killed 
at the same crossing. 
And the testimony of the witness Squires could not 
he admissible on the theory of proving notice to the 
defendant or the existence of a defective or dang~rous 
condition because the witness could not even testify to 
the fact that his car was stolen except through hearsay 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
and for the further reason that it was not anywhere 
shown that the occurrence was due to any negligence 
of the defendant, due to any defect or condition which 
the defendant might or should have remedied or any 
negligence of any employee which defendant could have 
corrected. 
In Hurd v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 8 Utah 241, 30 
Pac. 982, the action was for personal injuries caused 
by defendant's negligence, and the only question was 
whether or not a locomotive engine, which had moved 
without human agency and caused the injury, was in 
good repair at the time. The court held that evidence 
was inadmissible to show that other engines steamed up 
had moved without human agency and independent 
of any defect discoverable by the witness, the court 
pointing out that such evidence would tend to intro-
duce wholly collateral issues. 
In Perera v. Panama-Pacific International Exposi-
tion Co., supra, without discussing whether evidence of 
a prior theft was admissible in evidence, in directing 
judgment for the defendant, the court held that a prior 
theft was of no importance where there was no evi-
dence as to the circumstances of such prior theft. 
Assignment of Error No. VI 
It is a well-established rule of law that an agent has 
no authority after an event or transaction has occurred 
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to make admissions on behalf of his principal and con-
versations with an agent or employee after the occurrence 
of the transaction or event as against the principal are 
hearsay and not admissible evidence. 
Birmingham News Co. v. Browne, (Ala.) 153 So. 889: 
"The declarations of an agent as to past 
transactions * * ~': are not evidence against the 
principal. Only when a part of the res gestae or 
in a proper case by way of impeachment of the 
witness, upon predicate duly laid, can such evi-
dence be admitted. This rule has been long recog-
nized." 
See also the following cases: 
Sparks v. Maeschal {Ky.) 289 S. W. 308; 
Droullard v. Rudolph, (Iowa) 223 N. W. 100; 
Prestonsburg Superior Oil Gas Co. v. Vance, (Ky.) 
284 s. w. 405; 
Smith v. Emporium Mere. Co., Inc., (Minn.) 251 
N. W. 265; 
Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, (Ala.) 155 So. 601; 
Crock v. Magnolia Milling Co., (Wash.) 266 Pac. 
727; 
Wilkinson v. Queal Lumber Co., (Iowa) 226 N. 
w. 43; 
Cooley v. Killingsworth, (Iowa) 228 N. W. 880. 
Nothing that any of the employees at the garage told 
Squires in connection with the cause of his car being 
missing could in any way be binding on the defendant 
company, and the testimony of Squires as to any con-
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inadmissible evidence, and it was error for the court 
to overrule defendant's objections to such testimony. 
4. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR XIII AND XIV 
It was stipulated {Ab. 11) that the American Equit-
able Assurance Company paid to plaintiff under a col-
lision coverage policy, the amount of his loss under 
the policy. 
In Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395, 231 
Pac. 445, it is pointed out that by virtue of such pay-
ment, the insurance company becomes subrogated to the 
rights of the insured in· the amount of such payment and 
such subrogation rights are equivalent to an actual 
assignment, and in Session v. Hassett, 280 N. Y. S. 148, 
it is said: 
"The insurance company by its payment to 
plaintiff became the absolute owner of a propor-
tionate interest in her claim. To this extent, the 
insurance company is a necessary party, the 
real party in interest, in whose name the action 
for its proportion of the claim must be brought." 
It was error for the court, therefore, to find that 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of 
the loss and further find that the American Equitable 
Assurance Company had no claim. There is no assign-
ment shown from American Equitable Assurance Com-
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pany to plaintiff, and in the absence of such, Ameri-
~an Equitable Assurance Company would be the owner 
)f its portion of the recovery. 
5. ERROR IN PERMITTING AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT 
At the beginning of the trial, it was stipulated 
(Ab. 11) that in the event it should be decided that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover that the damages to be 
recovered are $'715.00 in addition to the usual taxable 
costs of court. It was most certainly error for the trial 
court to disregard the stipulation of the parties and 
permit plaintiff over defendant's objection (Ab. 38) 
to amend his complaint after the decision of the court, 
to ask for the additional amount in interest, and allow 
such additional amount to be included in the judgment. 
(Ab. 44). 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit: 
I. That defendant was entitled to be advised in 
the first instance how or in what manner it was claimed 
defendant was negligent. and the act and nature of the 
negligence charged, and the trial court erred in over-
ruling defendant's general and special demurrers to 
plaintiff's complaint and in overruling defendant's re-
peated objections to the introduction of any evidence 
raised prior to the introduction of any evidence, dur-
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ing the course of the trial, and prior to final submission 
of the case. 
II. A. That the evidence in this case is wholly 
insufficient to create liability on the part of defendant 
in that speculation is necessarily resorted to in (1) de~ 
termining the means by which Freeman succeeded in 
gaining entrance into the garage; (2) determining if de~ 
fendant was negligent and in what particular it could be 
said defendant was negligent; (3) that such speculated 
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. 
B. That the findings of the court are insufficient 
to sustain the judgment for the same reason and for the 
further reason that there is no finding of any specific 
negligence on the part of defendant, which was the proxi-
mate cause of the damage to plaintiff's automobile. 
III. That the court erred in: 
A. Refusing to strike the testimony of the wit-
ness Romney. 
B. Overruling defendant's objections to the testi-
mony of the witness Squires on the grounds that it re~ 
lated wholly to a collateral issue not shown to be similar 
to the theft of the Romney car. 
C. Overruling defendant's objections to the testi· 
mony of the witness Squires as to any conversations with 
defendant's employees, the same being hearsay as to the 
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defendant and in no way binding upon the defendant. 
IV. That the court erred in finding the defendant, 
American Equitable Assurance Company had no in-
terest· in the action. 
V. That the court erred in permitting plaintiff to 
amend his complaint after the decision of the court and 
contrary to the express stipulation of the parties relating 
to damages. 
VI. That the judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON 
& EDWIN B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant, Covey Garage 
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